tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3565094035783025080.post825339473608482357..comments2023-11-03T05:00:56.466-05:00Comments on I, herodotus: With Fear and Trembling, we approach Kierkegaard and his idea of faith and the absurd.-circa 02/13/2007herodotushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07820146025019530075noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3565094035783025080.post-47618937171693645952008-04-12T09:59:00.000-05:002008-04-12T09:59:00.000-05:00Dr. Zeius, there is much in your comment I disagre...Dr. Zeius, there is much in your comment I disagree with, but I will dispute just one point: that Isaac's ability to "elude" his father negates the latter's murderousness (in Ethical terms). I won't even refer here to all of our current legal definitions of murder and attempted murder (not to mention, as you nearly imply, that of assisted suicide). Simply this: Jesus was not only physically capable of eluding his murderers, but He also possessed divine power enabling Him to do so. I realize He said "No one takes my life from me BUT that I lay it down." [The "BUT" only makes the first clause conditional to the second; it does not mean His life is not taken from Him---indeed, just the opposite.] This does not abrogate the motives and actions of His killers: Jesus was murdered. That Isaac may have been willing to allow his father to kill him would not have cleansed Abraham's hands, in Ethical terms. It would still be filicide, murder. One can even argue that it was a case of attempted murder, which is de-facto murder. If there is any (Ethical) justice in the attempt to kill Isaac, de Silentio has nothing to write about, and we then have nothing here to discuss. "Fear and Trembling" exists only because God transformed an Ethically murderous action into one of faith. We, like de Silentio, are trying to understand how.testudineoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12701555431982391859noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3565094035783025080.post-8738573439401778882007-02-15T21:50:00.000-05:002007-02-15T21:50:00.000-05:00Wow guys, I wish I could offer something of value ...Wow guys, I wish I could offer something of value to your discussion. <BR/><BR/>As I recall, doesn't Silentio present the knight of faith as what society percieved to be a lunatic?Cincinnatushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08945915445661816051noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3565094035783025080.post-27878785253108995632007-02-14T19:36:00.000-05:002007-02-14T19:36:00.000-05:00Sounds great!Sounds great!Micahhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07866664453584849339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3565094035783025080.post-84511212647588554862007-02-14T15:59:00.000-05:002007-02-14T15:59:00.000-05:00As I said, I haven’t spent much time in the book i...As I said, I haven’t spent much time in the book in quite a while. So, I will stick more to addressing the questions set forth in it than I will to S.K.’s treatment of them.<BR/><BR/>“TELEOLOGICAL SUSPENSION OF THE ETHICAL”<BR/><BR/>The idea of a self-sustaining ethos:<BR/><BR/>One of the issues I have with the idea of the “teleological suspension…” is that it seems to approach the choice of one, as Abraham, as if the ethical were a universal, objective measure. I completely agree that the absolute is universal in that it places claims on all humanity, but the appliance of this standard to an ethos requires that the ethos be a truly universally understood and accepted measure which is simply not the case and has not been since the dawn of humanity. There has always existed, at the least, the tiniest variance of ethical persuasion from society to society, and the existence of even the tiniest variance compromises the universal application of any particular society’s ethical structure. The point in all this is to refute the idea that there can exist a distinction between the ethical and absolute where the belief or acknowledgement of the absolute exists. Simply put, one can only make a distinction between what is ethical and what is Godly when done so absent of a belief in God for the belief itself renders the ruling ethos obsolete and virtually inexistent. I believe Herodotus referred to this as the assertion of “the higher” or something of the sort.<BR/><BR/>In the advent of a universal ethos, both the absolute and ethical possess universality but only to the extent that their claims on every man are effective. So, the assent of the claims the absolute makes in the mind/life of the man directly result in the devaluating of the ethos he has been subjected to even if universally applied to all other men. As I see it, the claims of the ethical and absolute have to be inversely proportional in this sense. Not to say that they cannot make similar claims, but relevance is determined by the adherence of the man to one or the other, not in the existence of both claims. <BR/><BR/>More specifically, in a case like Abraham’s where the claims made by the ethical and the absolute seem to contradict each other, the idea of the “teleological suspension” only can exist for one other than Abraham himself (in other words one still claimed by the ethical and not the absolute) as his acknowledgement of and adherence to the absolute has replaced the ethical, not suspended it. This, of course, leaves the door open for comparing the modern-day jihadist to Abraham, but no further beyond that, I have no problem with this. Neither suspends their understanding of the ethical because, for both, the ethical has been redefined in light of the absolute, and the absolute commands them to kill.<BR/><BR/>OTHER THOUGHTS ON ABRAHAM:<BR/><BR/>Though this may distract from F&T, I thought it relevant to the discussion of Abraham’s ethical dilemma as it were. <BR/><BR/>The driving notion behind the question of “teleological suspension…” is the thought that Abraham was forced to either redefine or suspend the ethical in order to fulfill God’s command which was to “murder” his son. The most likely reality is that if Abraham were to have killed Isaac, it would not have been murder. While this doesn’t lessen the dilemma for Abraham, it does a lot to address the question of the ethicality of Abraham’s willingness to carry onward. Abraham’s actions could not have been murderous as Isaac most likely was compliant to his father’s wishes. How could this be? We’re taught to picture Isaac as being either a baby or a small child, partly due to linguistic assumption, when he had to have been at least a teenager (possibly even in his thirties) according to the Biblical chronology of events in Abraham’s life preceding God’s command for him to sacrifice Isaac. Also, from scripture we know that Abraham and Isaac left the two servants accompanying them at least a day’s travel from Moriah and that Isaac carried the wood for his own sacrifice. From this, we can know that Isaac had to have been at least big enough to carry the weight of the wood for an extended period of time (and up a mountain) and at least learned enough to understand the process of sacrificial worship as he is seen in scripture deducting from the wood, fire, and knife that they were to make a sacrifice upon reaching their destination. Lastly, the Hebrew word in this text that is translated to the English word “lad” does not indicate that he was necessarily young (I can’t remember the word offhand). Am I saying that he knew all along of his father’s intent? No, but if Isaac were old enough to do and understand these things, he was certainly old enough to elude or overpower his 100 year old plus father when being tied to the altar as he was. All I am saying is that it is more likely than not that, at some point, Isaac figured out what was going on and still wound up on the altar despite his ability to prevent it.<BR/><BR/>All that to merely suggest that questioning Abraham as having to have “suspended” his understanding of the ethical to accept God’s command may not be so accurate as in this case, it would not have qualified as murder. This leaves just the ethical question of human sacrifice. Abraham, at this point, was a stranger to his land and not subject to the ethos of his society as he was without the communities surrounding him most of which practiced human sacrifice as a regular part of the standard pagan Canaanite religious practice anyway.<BR/><BR/>Lastly, as I understand it, the point of this account is not to bring revelation of the absolute in relation to the ethical or absurd, but to bring revelation of the absolute as it relates to the desire of the individual. The sacrifice, and consequent attribution of faith, for Abraham was not of his understanding of what was right, but of what was his right, namely his right to Isaac (insert whatever you think is your right). I don’t have a hard time with his faith in the absurdity of God restoring the loss of Isaac because after all, this is a man that God had miraculously given Isaac to in the first place. So, the idea of the “ease” of the double movement is not so difficult for me as it relates to this particular instance.<BR/><BR/>cheers.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3565094035783025080.post-38224629045630552992007-02-14T14:40:00.000-05:002007-02-14T14:40:00.000-05:00thoughts:1. agamemnon's choice was given to him by...thoughts:<BR/><BR/>1. agamemnon's choice was given to him by the gods... resulting in ethical flexibility. abraham had no choice, but to obey...if faith is accorded him. abraham's choice was to obey the command 'faithfully'(jds)or to proceed in any manner...absent of faith. meaning, abraham was to obey faithfully, or not....agamemnon had no dilemma...he could choose.<BR/><BR/>2. o.k. i can agree that s.k.(jds) would say that the muslim jihadist is closer to the knight of resignation than one of faith. my main point here, though, is to say that the current practice of jihadist islam is descendant from the kierkegaardian idea of obedience to the absurd...as a necessary act of faith. let me re-state...this isn't in the text...just my attempt at application...or my attempt to point out current applications around us.<BR/><BR/>3. with your emphasis on the individuality of jds' idea of faith(and we agree here), would you definitively say that any residue of a group 'ethos' necessarily preecludes attribution of action or thought to s.k. or other existentialists?herodotushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07820146025019530075noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3565094035783025080.post-36193819851628318732007-02-14T13:30:00.000-05:002007-02-14T13:30:00.000-05:00Oh, but I must protest. First, Kierkegaard's Agam...Oh, but I must protest. First, Kierkegaard's Agamemnon did not suspend the ethical. He was still acting within the ethical if, as you say, his decision was a matter of utility. Second, I am not aware of any suicide bomber who has ever independently equipped him- or herself and set off on a mission without telling anyone. They are the function of a group mentality, an ethos, and this separates them from Kierkegaard's Abraham, severs them from his definition of "faith." Again, as per my original post, it is not so much obedience, blind or otherwise, that merits faith; it is the double movement---moving gracefully and "easily" in both the ethical and the absolute, and expecting a return in THIS LIFETIME. The jihadist and his or her parents simply do not have this, they do not make the double movement. If you really must, I could accede to them being knights of infinite resignation, as they relate to the absolute in SOME way, but it is not Kierkegaard's faith. Oh yeah, and Abraham DID have a choice (Lee Trevino: "Grizzly Adams DID have a beard."); even after choosing to go ahead with the sacrifice of Isaac, Kierkegaard relates three different possible choices AFTER that first choice, none of them resulting in faith. Hope I cleared that up for all of you.testudineoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12701555431982391859noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3565094035783025080.post-34650634900600864442007-02-14T13:06:00.000-05:002007-02-14T13:06:00.000-05:00after reading the intital post, i'm left with a co...after reading the intital post, i'm left with a couple of additional thoughts:<BR/><BR/>1. testud compares the jihadist to agamemnon and his 'greater good' dilemma , rather than abraham. my problem here is one of motive. in both cases(agamemnon and abraham) there is the 'teleological suspension of the ethical'...but only one is accorded faith for his action. if then, the jihadist's motive is for the 'dar-al-islam'...it is only this because of a direct order from an omnipotent God(absolute)....putting him closer to abraham. there is no ethical(universal)utility in the mass murder of infidels...only a direct commandment from an absolute to bring about his kingdom...through whatever means necessary....including the killing of other muslims. where agamemnon had a choice(given to him by the gods), there is no choice for abraham and the modern muslim jihadist...it is an issue of obedience...first and foremost.<BR/><BR/>2. none of the above is actually found in the text, and this difference is one of philosophical application, rather than textual analysis. again, s.k. is obscurant with regards to application or personal affiliation.herodotushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07820146025019530075noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3565094035783025080.post-42011716641733591242007-02-14T11:53:00.000-05:002007-02-14T11:53:00.000-05:00dr.z and all- both. generally, the idea here at th...dr.z and all- both. generally, the idea here at the site is to open, deepen, and dive into conversation. specifically, with this post, the same is true. clearly, testud and i have different interpretations on some important things found in f&t. this said, the text is open ended in many ways, so.....pontificate on!herodotushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07820146025019530075noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3565094035783025080.post-92009266975568370892007-02-14T09:11:00.000-05:002007-02-14T09:11:00.000-05:00Is the purpose of this post to post a conversation...Is the purpose of this post to post a conversation (on F&T) or to start a conversation (on the questions asked by F&T)?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com